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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: REDEFINING A "SEARCH"
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
FLORIDA v. JARDINES, 133 S. CT. 1409 (2013)
Vanessa Madrid

I. FACTS
Respondent was charged with trafficking cannabis when a narcotics
detection dog gave a positive alert for narcotics on Respondent's front
porch. Subsequently, Respondent moved to suppress the evidence
seized, asserting that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated
due to Petitioner's unreasonable search of his front porch without a
warrant.' Petitioners appealed the suppression order and the Third
District Court of Appeal reversed. Respondent's petition for
discretionary review was granted and the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the use of a trained
narcotics dog to investigate whether Respondent had engaged in illicit
activities was an intrusion and constitutes a search that requires a
warrant. 3 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, affirmed the
Florida Supreme Court decision, and HELD, that the government's use
of a police dog to explore the home and its curtilage constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search unsupported by probable cause.4
II. HISTORY
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants protection
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, University of Florida Levin College of Law. This Case
Comment is dedicated to my parents, Libardo and Luz Eugenia Madrid, and my sister, Natalia
Madrid. I would also like to thank Juan Miguel Gonzalez for his love and support. Editor's
Note: This Case Comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the Outstanding Case
Comment of Fall 2014.
1. Id. A month afler receiving a tip that Respondent's home was being used to grow
marijuana, a team of members of the Miami-Dade Police Department and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) was sent to investigate Respondent's home. Id.
2. Id. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's suppression order on the grounds
that the use of drug-sniffing dog is not a search. Id; see also State v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d I (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2008), decision quashed,73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011), affd, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
3. Id. The Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision of the court of appeals and held
that the search of a private residence must be supported by a probable cause. Id
4. See id. at 1417-18.
413
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against unreasonable searches.5 History and tradition indicate that the
Fourth Amendment prohibits any warrantless invasion of the privacy of
life within the home. The U.S. Supreme Court has demonstrated an
inclination to expand the protections of the Fourth Amendment. In
Oliver v. United States,7 the Court defined the boundaries of the
curtilage to include the area around the home where an individual may
reasonably expect that such area should be treated as the home itself.8
In Oliver, the Supreme Court addressed what constitutes an open
field and whether intrusion upon open fields is an unreasonable search
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 9 After being informed that
Petitioner's farm was being used to grow marijuana, law enforcement
agents entered Petitioner's farm without a warrant.10 The agents
disregarded the "No Trespassing" sign on a locked gate and walked
several hundred yards until they reached a field of marijuana."
Petitioner was later charged with manufacturing of a controlled
substance. 12
Assessing the degree to which society is pre ared to recognize an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, the U.S. Supreme
Court concluded that the agent's intrusion was that of an open field and
does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.14 The Court stressed that the
extent of the curtilage protected by the Fourth Amendment is influenced
by an individual's reasonable expectation that the area in question
should be treated as a home itself, where intimate activity associated
with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life takes place.15
However, because the marijuana field was over a mile from Petitioner's

5. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
6. Eg., Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
7. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
8. Id. at 180.
9. Id. at 173.
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 177.
14. Id. at 181.
15. Id. at 180. The Court distinguished between an open field and the curtilage of a home
for purposes of Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
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home, no warrant was required.16
After Oliver, the U.S. Supreme Court continued to recognize that the
Fourth Amendment protects the area immediately adjacent to the home
to which the activity of home life extends.' 7 However, California v.
Ciraolo'8 limited the scope of the Fourth Amendment, establishing that
plain view from a lawful vantage point was not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.19 In Ciraolo, an anonymous informant advised the police
that marijuana was being grown in Respondent's backyard.20 In
response, two police officers conducted an aerial observation of
Respondent's backyard at an altitude of 1,000 feet and verified the
presence of marijuana plants. 2 1
Acknowledging that the curtilage includes those areas with a
physical and psychological nexus to a home,22 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that Respondent's backyard falls within the curtilage of his home. 23
Ciraolo elucidated the need to clarify that simply because an area is
encompassed by the curtilage does not preclude all police observation. 24
The Court explained that the Fourth Amendment does not require the
police traveling in navigable airspace, to obtain a warrant in order to
observe what is plainly visible to the naked eye. 25 Thus, in justifying the
admission of evidence in support of Respondent's conviction of
cultivation of marijuana,2 6 the Supreme Court ruled that what a person
exposes publicly, even within the curtilage of his home, is not subject to
Fourth Amendment protections. 2 7
The U.S. Supreme Court revisited the plain view doctrine in Kyllo v.
United States.2 Petitioner argued that the use of a thermal imaging
device from the public street aimed at his home to reveal the presence of
halide lights being used to grow marijuana constituted a violation of his

16. See id at 182. An open field can be searched without a warrant because society does
not recognize an expectation of privacy in such areas-even when those areas are bounded by
fences with "no trespassing" signs. Id. at 179-80.
17. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013).
18. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
19. Id. at 215.
20. Id at 209.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 213.
23. Id.
24. Id
25. Id. Respondent lacked an expectation of privacy in things exposed in his backyard,
and readily visible by the naked eye, that society would be prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Id. at 214.
26. Id. at 209-10. After the police officer's aerial observations, a search warrant was
administered and the marijuana plants were seized. Id. at 209.
27. Id. at 213.
28. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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Fourth Amendment protections. 29 Establishing a "bright" and "firm"
line at "the entrance of the house," the Court limited the scope of the
plain view doctrine. 30 The Court held that whenever the government
deploys a device "not in general public use," 31 to explore the details of a
home's interior that otherwise would not have been known without
physical intrusion, the surveillance constitutes a search and is
presumably unreasonable without a warrant.32 Thus, the Court ruled that
the information gathered in the surveillance of Petitioner's home was
the result of a warrantless search.3 3
For the first time, in United States v. Jones,3 4 the U.S. Supreme
Court deviated from the reasonable expectations standard 3 5 and, instead,
used a property rights analysis.36 In Jones, the Court concluded that the
Fourth Amendment protected personal propert. As such, a vehicle is an
"effect" protected by the Fourth Amendment.3 The Court also reasoned
that installing a GPS on a vehicle constituted trespassory activity.3 8
Thus, the Court held that the government's installation of a GPS device
on Respondent's vehicle to supervise the vehicle's movements was a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 39
III. INSTANT CASE

In the instant case, the U.S. Supreme Court did not review whether
Respondent had an reasonable expectation of privacy in his front porch
that society would be prepared to recognize as reasonable, because it
was assumed that he did. 0 Instead, the Court focused on whether the
government gained information by "physically intruding on persons,
houses, papers or effects." 4 1 In its analysis, the Court drew much of its
support from Jones.42 The majority examined the purpose and
protections of the Fourth Amendment, noting that although property
rights are not the sole measure of the Fourth Amendment, when the
29.
30.
31.
agencies.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 29-30.
Id at 40.
Referring to sophisticated devices or technology usually used by government
Id at 46.
Id at 40.
Id
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
See supra text accompanying note 14.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012).
Id at 949.
Id
Id
See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
Id at 1414 (quotingJones, 132 S. Ct. at 950-51).
Id at 1414-18.
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government physically intrudes on a constitutionally protected area, a
search has occurred.4 3
Second, the majority applied the traditional definition of a curtilage
set forth in Oliver, and determined that the front porch of Respondent's
home fell within that definition.4 Moreover, the Court concluded that
the officers, by entering the porch of the home without permission and
without a warrant, engaged in physical intrusion.4 5 Next, the majority
distinguished between an unarmed officer with a warrant who knocks
on a home's front door, and an officer who uses a police trained dog to
explore the front door.4 6 The Court explained that the scope of an
invitee license is only limited to what social norms would allow a
visitor to do. 4 7 Therefore, the Court concluded that the sanctity of the
Respondent's home was violated by the government's use of a drugsniffing dog.4
Finally, in rejecting the Petitioner's argument that forensic dogs have
been widely used by law enforcement, the majority noted that the
ancientness of the use of narcotic dogs is irrelevant. 4 Thus, the Jones
standard led the Court to conclude that the government's use of a
trained narcotics detection dog on the front door of a home constituted a
physical intrusion; hence, the information gained by the government
was the result of an unreasonable search.5 0
In a fervent dissent, Justice Alito, Joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer, portrayed the Court's reasoning of
law of trespass as meritless. 5 ' The dissent opposed the majority's view
that the police officer was intruding simply because he was
accompanied by a trained dog. 52 In addition, the dissent disagreed with
the majority's inconsistent application of the reasonable expectation of
privacy test 5 3 and argued that the instant holding conflicted with the
notion that society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable an
expectation of privacy in odors emanating from a house.54

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See id. at 1414.
Id. at 1415.
Id.
Id. at 1416.
Id.
See id. at 1416-17.
Id. at 1417.
Id. at 1417-18.
See id. at 1420-21 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1421.
Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
By declining to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test,55
the instant Court dramatically departed from precedent.5 6 Unlike in
Oliver, the Court in the instant case refused to apply an exclusive
reasonable-expectation-based analysis because it feared that doing so
would result in an outcome not compatible with the Fourth
Amendment's "right . . . to . . . retreat into [one's] home and there be

free from unreasonable government intrusion."57 Nonetheless, the Court
in the instant case showed no intention to limit or expand what
constitutes the curtilage of the home. 58 Instead, the instant Court relied
on Oliver to justify its finding that the police officers entered the
curtilage, since the curtilage includes those areas that immediately
surround and are associated with the home, such as a porch.5 9
The instant court distinguished between a "physically nonintrusive"
investigation, and one that involves physical intrusion within a
constitutionally protected area.60 That, the court suggested, was the
difference between the instant case and Ciraolo.61 In addition, the
instant Court emphasized that a police officer may act only as licensed
by the homeowner.62 Thus, the instant case heightened the protection of
the home.63
Furthermore, the instant Court refrained from applying the
reasonable expectations test because, as noted in Kyllo, the test is often
criticized for being "circular .

.

. and unpredictable." 64 Therefore, in an

effort to provide more concrete resolutions consistent with the core
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, the Court turned to property

law. 65
The practical effect of Jones has been that of a shift in focus from
the traditional analysis, placing emphasis on physical propert rights as
a measure of Fourth Amendment unreasonable searches.6 Prior to
Jones, the Court based the Fourth Amendment analysis on whether the
55. See supra text accompanying note 14.
56. See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
57. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414-15.
58. See id. (stating that the curtilage principle has "ancient and durable" roots). Id. at
1414.
59. Id at 1415.
60. Id. (quoting Entick v. Carrington, K.B. 275, Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765)).
61. Id.; see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
62. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415; see also Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
63. The Supreme Court stated that "when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is
first among equals." Id. at 1414.
64. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,34(2001).
65. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
66. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012).
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government had intruded upon a place or thing in which someone had a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 67 The instant Court fundamentall
reaffirmed the intrusion test. Using an analysis analogous to Jones',
the Court held that the government's use of a trained narcotics detection
dog on the front door of a home constituted a physical intrusion.69
The instant Court placed particular weight on the common law of
trespass discussed in Jones,70 which according to the Court, made the
Moreover, by attacking the
instant case a forthright one.
constitutionality of the evidence seized as the product of a warrant
supported by the information police gathered while using a trained drug
dog within the curtilage of a home, the instant Court considered Kyllo
and Jones with regard to the Fourth Amendment and their protections
against policing techniques. Together, the Kyllo and Jones decisions
stand as an important protection against government efforts to encroach
on the privacy of an individual's home.
The instant Court noted that the use of a trained dog parallels the use
72
of the thermal imaging device in Kyllo. Further, given society's
reliance on technology, the new "physical intrusion" test set forth in
Jones helped redefine what constitutes a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment and also emphasized the right of citizens to be free from
warrantless government intrusions in their homes.7 3 Thus, the Court
relied on both cases to determine that using a narcotics detection dog to
search for evidence is not an activity that falls within customary
invitation. 74 Under the logic of the Court, future courts would be
compelled to balance the common law of trespass and property rights
with an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy when
determining what constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION

In an effort to generate prudent public policy and place a check on
the government's powers, the instant Court found that police officers'
use of a narcotic detection dog to inspect the front porch of a home is
67. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
68. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.
69. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
70. Id at 1414.
71. Id Whenever the government "does engage in a physical intrusion of a
constitutionally protected area," the case becomes a simple one. Id. (citing United States v.

Knotts, 560 U.S. 276, 286 (1983)).
72.
73.
74.

See id.at 1417.
See id. at 1414.
See id at 1416.
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outside the scope of an implied invitation by the homeowner." Thus,
the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that a physical intrusion in a
constitutionally protected area is a Fourth Amendment search
unsupported by probable cause. Evidently, in the instant case, the
Court has heightened the protection of the home.
It is clear that the motivation behind this deviant posture is to protect
individuals from searches using techniques not explicitly mentioned by
the Fourth Amendment. Although narrow, the decision in the instant
case was similar to Jones's and, at the very minimum, safeguards from
intrusive government searches.

75. Id at 1415-16.
76. See id at 1417-18.

